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“ ‘Ought’ is our most basic normative term. I understand it well.”
John Broome†
1. The detaching problem
Consider the following ‘ought’-sentence:
(1) You ought to take Michigan Avenue.
This sounds a bit odd out of the blue. A natural response to an ut-
terance of (1) out of context might be, “You ought to take Michigan
Avenue to where, or for what purpose?” However, situating (1) in the
following practical argument seems to resolve such concerns.
(1∗) (P1) If you want to go to the Hancock Building, you ought to
take Michigan Avenue.
(P2) You want to go to the Hancock Building.
(C1) So, you ought to take Michigan Avenue.
In this context, the conclusion seems perfectly acceptable, and the ar-
gument lends strong support for the conclusion. By modus ponens, it
seems we can derive—or “detach”— the unembedded ‘ought’-claim
in (C1) from the associated hypothetical imperative (P1) and its an-
tecedent condition (P2).1
However, there’s a well-known puzzle about whether unembedded
‘ought’-claims can validly detach in this way. Consider (2).
(2) You ought to torture innocent people with thumbscrews.
(2) is, well, false. Embedding (2) in the following argument does not
seem to help its case:
†Broome 2005, 326.
1Several other types of detachment have been discussed in the deontic logic
literature—e.g., “deontic detachment” and “unalterability detachment”, where
one derives an ‘ought’-claim from an associated conditional ‘ought’ and the
obligatoriness or unalterability, respectively, of its antecedent condition. I will
not consider these forms of inference here. For discussion, see Greenspan 1975,
Feldman 1986, Humberstone 1991, and Arregui 2010.
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(2∗) (P3) If you want to torture innocent people like they did in
medieval times, you ought to torture them with thumb-
screws.
(P4) You want to torture innocent people like they did in
medieval times.
(C2) So, you ought to torture innocent people with thumb-
screws.
Unlike in (1∗), the ‘ought’-claim in the conclusion does not seem to be
able to detach; your crazy goals and the means of realizing them seem
irrelevant to your obligations not to torture innocent people. Call the
problem of how certain objectionable ‘ought’-claims like (C2) can be
derived from associated conditionals and their antecedent conditions
the detaching problem.
I will argue that a standard analysis of modals from formal seman-
tics suggests a solution to the detaching problem. The general form of
this solution has also been recently defended in independent work by
Janice Dowell [2012]. However, Dowell’s arguments against rival views
are inconclusive (§2). I will offer improved arguments against these
views, and others, in motivating my preferred solution. This solution
also captures new data concerning the detaching problem and sheds
light on the role of hypothetical imperatives and detached ‘ought’-
claims in practical reasoning (§3). Although modus ponens can be
shown to fail with conditionals like (P1) and (P3), the cases in ques-
tion do not constitute a failure of detachment in the sense that ethicists
have cared about in discussions of the detaching problem (§4).
2. How not to solve the detaching problem
Conditionals like those in (1∗)–(2∗) that concern an agent’s goal, in-
tention, desire, or plan in the antecedent and a modal claim in the
consequent about the agent’s performance of a certain action are often
called hypothetical imperatives2 or anankastic conditionals. Call an ar-
2The conditionals we will be concerned with are obviously not genuinely
hypothetical imperatives, as they contain no imperative clause. I follow the com-
gument of the form ‘If want φ, ought ψ; Want φ; So, ought ψ’ whose
conditional premise is an anankastic conditional an AnankasticModus
Ponens argument—or, AMP. (This name is contentious in several re-
spects, as we will see. For concreteness I will express hypothetical im-
peratives with ‘want’. This is neutral on the question of how ends are
to be characterized.)
In response to the detaching problem, first, one might say that
‘ought’ is lexically ambiguous and that AMPs are invalid when the
‘ought’s have different senses—e.g., if a moral ‘ought’ is used in the
conclusion and some sort of non-moral ‘ought’ is used in the condi-
tional premise. Second, one might claim that AMPs are valid but that
the conditional premises merely supply technical requirements; hence,
the conclusions lack normative force. Third, one might say that AMPs
are invalid, and not in fact instances of modus ponens, because their
conditional premises have a non-obvious logical form. For example,
on so-called wide-scoping accounts—as advanced by John Broome,
Jonathan Dancy, Stephen Darwall, and R. Jay Wallace, among oth-
ers— the ‘ought’s in hypothetical imperatives are practical ‘ought’s
that take wide scope over a material conditional.3 Accordingly, unem-
bedded ‘ought’-claims cannot detach, since one can satisfy the ‘ought’
in a hypothetical imperative by taking the means or by abandoning the
end.
There is something importantly right about the intuitions driving
these responses, as we will see, but they are insufficient as they stand.
Simply positing a lexical ambiguity is problematic. Why stop with only
two senses of ‘ought’ when there are also prudential ‘ought’s, rational
‘ought’s, legal ‘ought’s, aesthetic ‘ought’s, and so on? Positing that
speakers have such a proliferation of ‘ought’ entries in their lexicons
mon practice of using the term ‘hypothetical imperative’ broadly to cover cases
where the consequent consists of a modal claim about what an agent ought or
must do.
3See, e.g., Hill 1973, Greenspan 1975, Darwall 1983, 2001, Gensler 1985,
Hampton 1998, Broome 1999, 2001b, 2002, 2004, 2007, Dancy 2000, Wallace
2001, Way 2010. Terminology varies among authors. See also the references in
n. 17 for discussion.
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is profligate and unexplanatory.4 As for the technical requirements re-
sponse, it fails to capture the practicality of AMPs, or their connection
with motivation and action. Wide-scoping accounts have the advantage
of treating AMPs as practical arguments, insofar as they understand
hypothetical imperatives as injunctions to have certain sorts of coher-
ent combinations of attitudes and actions. These accounts gain traction
from the intuition that there does seem to be something irrational in
not taking or intending the believed necessary means to an intended
end. However, one might worry that the wide-scoping response leaves
agents in a sort of practical deadlock—“Either abandon the end or
take the necessary means!”—and thus does not adequately capture
the directiveness of hypothetical imperatives in practical reasoning.5
It is not counterintuitive that at least sometimes we can derive action-
guiding principles from considerations about our goals and the avail-
able means to them. Although the wide-scoping response blocks seem-
ingly problematic conclusions like the one in (2∗), one might worry that
it blocks too much.
2.1 Wide-scoping: An obituary
These normative concerns with the wide-scoping account are sugges-
tive but not decisive. The wide-scoper might deny that the role of
wide-scope rational requirements is to guide one’s practical reasoning
toward some specific intention or action. Or she might say that wide-
scope requirements must be supplemented with further narrow-scope
considerations, perhaps concerning the agent’s reasons for abandon-
ing the end or taking the necessary means, in order to issue a specific
injunction (Broome 2007). In light of these possible responses I want
4Cf. Grice’s “Modified Occam’s Razor”: “Senses are not to be multiplied
beyond necessity” (1989, 47–49). For discussion, in the ethics literature, of pro-
liferating senses of ‘ought’, see, e.g., Wertheimer 1972, Jackson 1991, Finlay
2009, 2010, and van Roojen 2010 (cf. Brandt 1964, 381). For discussion in philos-
ophy of language and linguistics, see especially Kratzer 1977, 1981, 1991; see
also, among many others, Lyons 1977, Perkins 1983, Brennan 1993, Groefsema
1995, Papafragou 2000, and Palmer 2001 (though cf. Coates 1983, Palmer 1990).
5Cf. Kolodny 2005, 527–530; Schroeder 2004, 339–340; Bedke 2009, 687–689.
to examine the wide-scoping analysis from a different angle. Though
wide-scoping responses to the detaching problem are not typically put
forward with linguistic considerations in mind, this does not render
them immune from linguistic objections. The wide-scoping analysis
constitutes a substantive hypothesis about the logical form and mean-
ing of hypothetical imperatives. This hypothesis is not innocent.
First let’s improve the wide-scoping analysis in response to some
preliminary concerns. One might object to wide-scoping accounts on
the grounds that analyses of indicative conditionals in terms of ma-
terial implication face well-known problems:6 Since material condi-
tionals play no role in the formalization of indicative conditionals, a
fortiori they play no role in the formalization of hypothetical impera-
tives, which are a species of indicative conditional. This is essentially
the objection found in Dowell 2012.
This objection is too quick. Even if indicative conditionals are not
to be analyzed in terms of a two-place material conditional connec-
tive, indicative conditionals can still sometimes be interpreted as mate-
rial conditionals in certain contexts. Consider the paradigm restrictor
analysis of conditionals from Angelika Kratzer (1981, 68–69; 1991, 648–
649), following Lewis 1975. (The following points could also be made
in terms of the “variably strict” analyses in Stalnaker 1968 and Lewis
1973.) Though the details would take us too far afield, on this view
‘if’-clauses restrict the domains of operators like modals, and modals
are treated as quantifiers over possible worlds (§3). Material implica-
tion is expressed when the ‘if’-clause “restricts” an implicit necessity
modal whose domain is already restricted to the actual world (or, more
precisely, to the world of evaluation). On a material conditional inter-
pretation, ‘If φ, ψ’ is true iff ‘φ’ is true at all worlds identical to the
actual world; that is, the conditional is true iff either ‘φ’ is false— in
which case ψ is trivially necessary—or ‘ψ’ is true.
6For survey discussions, see, e.g., Edgington 1995, 241–247; Bennett 2003,
20–44. Cf. Lewis 1975, Kratzer 1991.
philosophers’ imprint - 3 - vol. 14, no. 7 (march 2014)
alex silk Why ‘Ought’ Detaches
A linguistically improved wide-scope analysis—call it ‘wide-
scope+’—might treat the ‘ought’s in hypothetical imperatives as tak-
ing wide scope over a conditional that expresses material implication
in this way. Assuming that deontic modals like ‘ought’ quantify over a
set of deontically best worlds, we can, in the spirit of the wide-scope
strategy, still capture how hypothetical imperatives like (P3) are true
and how (P3) and (P4) do not entail (C2). (P3) is true because in the
deontically best worlds no one wants to torture innocent people. So, ‘If
you want to torture innocent people like they did in medieval times,
you torture them with thumbscrews’, interpreted as a material condi-
tional, is trivially true at all the deontically best worlds. Nonetheless,
even if (P4) is true, (C2) is false, since it’s not the case that in all of
the deontically best worlds you torture innocent people with thumb-
screws. So is the wide-scoper off the semantic hook?
Unfortunately not. First, at least on a standard restrictor analysis
of conditionals like Kratzer’s, ‘if’-clauses must restrict the domain of
some operator, like a modal. But once the overt ‘ought’ in a hypotheti-
cal imperative takes wide scope and is left unrestricted (or, if restricted,
only implicitly so by the context), this leaves no operator for the ‘if’-
clause to restrict. In response the wide-scoper could posit that there
is an implicit necessity modal in hypothetical imperatives that scopes
over the (now unmodalized) consequent and is restricted by the an-
tecedent. However, although covert modals have been posited in vari-
ous conditional constructions, on such analyses it is the covert modal
that takes wider scope.7 Wide-scope+ would thus lack independent
motivation.
Even with these technical problems notwithstanding, wide-scope+
gets the meanings of hypothetical imperatives wrong. For the sake of
argument, assume that (P3) contains a covert modal whose domain
is restricted to the world of evaluation, so that the conditional under
the wide-scoped deontic ‘ought’ expresses material implication. Since
7See Frank 1996, Geurts 2004, von Fintel and Iatridou 2005, Leslie 2009,
Swanson 2010, and Silk 2010.
‘ought’ shifts the world of evaluation to the deontically best worlds, the
domain of this covert modal gets restricted to each of the deontically
best worlds. But further restricting this domain to those where you
want to torture innocent people yields the empty set; in none of the
best worlds do you want to torture innocent people. (P3) then comes
out true because the proposition that you torture innocent people with
thumbscrews is trivially a necessity with respect to the empty set.
Somewhat more formally, the truth conditions of (P3) according to
wide-scope+ are roughly as in (3) or, simplifying a bit, as in (4).
(3) (P3) is true at a world w iff:
for all deontically best worlds w′: for all worlds w′′ consistent
with all the facts in w′ in which you want to torture innocent
people like they did in medieval times: you use thumbscrews
in w′′
(4) (P3) is true at a world w iff:
for all deontically best worlds w′ in which you want to tor-
ture innocent people like they did in medieval times: you use
thumbscrews in w′
For every deontically best world w′, intersecting {w′} with the set of
worlds in which you want to torture innocent people like they did in
medieval times yields the empty set. Since any proposition—and so
the proposition expressed by ‘you torture innocent people with thumb-
screws’— is trivially a necessity with respect to the empty set, (P3)
comes out true.
But this gets the meaning of (P3) all wrong. First, the analysis incor-
rectly predicts that any hypothetical imperative beginning with ‘If you
want to torture innocent people like they did in medieval times. . . ’ is
trivially true—even one with ‘you ought not torture them with thumb-
screws’ as the consequent. If (P3) is true, it is not trivially true in the
way predicted by wide-scope+. Second, we may even be granting too
much in conceding that wide-scope+ predicts that (P3) is true. As is
well-known, when quantifier domains are empty, this typically results
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in infelicity.8 (Cf. ‘Every unicorn around here. . . ’ or ‘If Massachusetts
isn’t in the United States. . . ’) But there is nothing odd about (P3).
In sum, in order to respond to the detaching problem, the wide-
scoper’s analysis of the major premise must (a) capture in what way
the major premise is true, and (b) invalidate detachment. Thoughwide-
scope+ does invalidate detachment, even if it predicts that (P3) is
true, (P3) comes out true for the wrong reasons. The features of wide-
scope+ that would allow it to predict the truth of (P3) generate incor-
rect predictions about the truth conditions of other hypothetical im-
peratives.
Similar considerations show that the wide-scoping analysis
founders in response to quantificational variants of the detaching prob-
lem. Consider a domain with five people— A, B, C, D, E—each of
whom aims to torture innocent people with thumbscrews. Now con-
sider the following argument:
(5) (P5) Most people who want to torture innocent people like
they did in medieval times ought to torture them with
thumbscrews.
(P6) A, B, and C each wants to torture innocent people like
they did in medieval times.
(C3) So, A ought to torture innocent people with thumb-
screws, or B ought to torture innocent people with
thumbscrews, or C ought to torture innocent people
with thumbscrews.
Intuitively, the conclusion must be true if the premises are true. If (P5)
is true, at least three people out of A–E are such that they ought to use
thumbscrews to do their torturing. So, for any three individuals out
of A–E—e.g., A, B, and C, as per (P6)— it follows that at least one of
them ought to use thumbscrews—as per (C3).
8See, e.g., Strawson 1952, Geurts and van der Sandt 1999.
As with (2∗), the wide-scoper will say that (5) is invalid. An ini-
tial problem, however, is that she cannot argue that (5) is invalid by
claiming that the ‘ought’ in (P5) takes wide scope over a material con-
ditional. In short, it can’t be that ‘ought’ takes wide scope over a ma-
terial conditional in (P5), since the ‘ought’-claim in (6) can be satisfied
without the ‘ought’-claim in (P5) being satisfied.9
(6) Most people ought to ensure that (they want to torture inno-
cent people like they did in medieval times ⊃ they use thumb-
screws).
Consider a domain consisting of 100 people, 10 of whom want to tor-
ture innocent people like in medieval times. None of the 10 torture-
wanters use thumbscrews. Then the ‘ought’ in (6) is satisfied: 90 of the
100 people have the property of either torturing with thumbscrews or
not wanting to torture innocent people like in medieval times, since
they do not have the goal in question. However, the ‘ought’ in (P5)
is not satisfied: none of the 10 torture-wanters use thumbscrews. So,
(P5) is not equivalent to (6). So, there is no material conditional in the
formalization of (P5) for the ‘ought’ to scope over.
Paralleling our dialectic above, the wide-scoper might respond by
dropping the claim that it is a material conditional that ‘ought’ is scop-
ing over in (P5). Instead she might represent (P5) as follows, treating
‘most’ as a generalized quantifier.
(7) OUGHT (most x: x wants to torture innocent people like they
did in medieval times) (x tortures them with thumbscrews)
Roughly, on this analysis (P5) says that it ought to be that (for most
x such that x wants to torture medievally, x uses thumbscrews). This
handles our objection above. However, like we saw in the conditional
case, this “improvement” makes incorrect predictions about (P5). If
9The point is a general one: as work in generalized quantifier theory has
shown, material conditionals simply do not play a role in formalizing sentences
with nominal quantifiers. See, e.g., Lewis 1970, Montague 1973, Barwise and
Cooper 1981, McCawley 1981. Cf. Lewis 1975 on adverbial quantifiers.
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the quantifier ‘most’ has an empty domain, the analysis predicts that
(P5)—and any sentence of the form ‘Most people who want to tor-
ture innocent people ought to φ’— should be infelicitous. (Cf. ‘Most
unicorns. . . ’.) But (P5) is perfectly acceptable. So we still do not have
an analysis of (P5) which predicts that it is both true and felicitous.
The wide-scoper is without a solution to quantificational variants of
the detaching problem.
It is worth clarifying the scope of these objections. The arguments in
this section do not by themselves show that there are no wide-scope ra-
tional requirements. What they show is that wide-scopers should stop
appealing to natural language intuitions about hypothetical impera-
tives and the (in)validity of arguments like (2∗) in their arguments for
there being wide-scope requirements. There may be independent ar-
guments for the conclusion that there are such requirements. But these
arguments will need to be just that: independent—that is, independent
of linguistic intuitions like the intuition that arguments like (2∗) are
invalid.
The considerations in this section suggest the following desiderata
for a response to the detaching problem. An adequate solution must
• Capture the different reactions we have to different sorts of AMPs:
AMPs with plausible conclusions can seem valid, lending support
to their conclusions; but AMPs with implausible conclusions seem
invalid, lending no support to their conclusions.
• Capture how, at least sometimes, hypothetical imperatives can be
used to generate normative, action-guiding conclusions.
• Capture as much commonality in interpretations of ‘ought’ as the
data allows.
• Be semantically adequate and extend to quantificational variants.
3. Why ‘ought’ detaches
I will argue that a stock analysis of modals and conditionals from for-
mal semantics suggests a solution to the detaching problem. I am sym-
pathetic to the standard view among formal semanticists that although
modals can be used to express different flavors of modality, “there is
something in the meaning [of the modal. . . ] which stays invariable”
(Kratzer 1977, 340; see also n. 4). For instance, there seems to be some-
thing common to the meaning of ‘ought’ in the various interpretations
in (8).
(8) a. (Given when she said she left,) Alice ought to be here by
now. [epistemic]
b. (Given her aim of getting into a good college,) Alice ought
to study hard. [teleological]
c. (In view of what morality requires,) Alice ought to help
the poor. [deontic]
This ability to take on different readings in different contexts is com-
mon among modal expressions across languages.10 These considera-
tions speak against treating modals as multiply ambiguous and build-
ing particular readings into their conventional meanings. The orthodox
view in reply is to treat modals as having a rather skeletal conventional
meaning and receiving a particular reading—moral, teleological, epis-
temic, etc.—only relative to certain forms of contextual supplementa-
tion. According to the most influential version of this idea, from An-
gelika Kratzer (1981; 1991), modals must be interpreted relative to two
“conversational backgrounds”, or functions from possible worlds into
sets of propositions. These conversational backgrounds determine a
modal base—which determines a set of accessible worlds—and an or-
dering source—which induces an ordering on these worlds. In a sen-
tence like (1), the modal base is circumstantial—a set of propositions
describing the relevant circumstances (e.g., your location, the traf-
fic conditions, etc.); and the ordering source is teleological—a set of
propositions describing the contents of your goals. Roughly, the modal
quantifies over those worlds consistent with the modal base that are
“best” in view of the ideal set up by the ordering source. To a first
10See Perkins 1983, Bybee et al. 1994, Palmer 2001 (though cf. van der Auwera
et al. 2005).
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approximation, ‘Ought φ’ is true iff ‘φ’ is true at all the relevant worlds
that rank highest in the ordering.11 Importantly, on this type of anal-
ysis, modals are not ambiguous; they are not like ‘bank’. Rather, they
are semantically incomplete and context-dependent; they have differ-
ent readings in different contexts from different contextual resolutions
of modal base and ordering source.
In some way to be specified, the antecedent of a hypothetical imper-
ative introduces a goal the content of which is used to order the acces-
sible worlds. I need not take a stand here on precisely how the content
of the goal mentioned in the antecedent figures into the overt modal’s
ordering source; that it does figure in this way is acknowledged by
all in the literature on anankastic conditionals.12 (For now let’s make
the simplifying assumption that the relevant agent’s goals are jointly
consistent with one another and with the goal introduced in the an-
tecedent of the hypothetical imperative. I return to these assumptions
in §4.) Making explicit the relevant conversational backgrounds, this
suggests the following informal paraphrase of (P1).
(9) Given the relevant circumstances, and ordering alternatives in
terms of their satisfaction of your goal of going to the Hancock
Building, taking Michigan Avenue is best.
As this brings out, the modal base of ‘ought’ is the set of propositions
describing the relevant circumstances, and the ordering source consists
of, or contains, the proposition that you go to the Hancock Building.
With this informal analysis of (P1) at hand, let’s return to (1∗).
11For simplicity I make the limit assumption (Lewis 1973, 19–20) to ensure
that there is a set of most highly ranked worlds. I also bracket differences
in strength between weak necessity modals like ‘ought’ and strong necessity
modals like ‘must’ (see Silk 2014 and references therein).
12See, e.g., Sæbø 2001, von Fintel and Iatridou 2005, Huitink 2005a,b, von Ste-
chow et al. 2006, Silk 2010.
(1∗) (P1) If you want to go to the Hancock Building, you ought to
take Michigan Avenue.
(P2) You want to go to the Hancock Building.
(C1) So, you ought to take Michigan Avenue.
Will the unembedded ‘ought’-claim in (C1) detach from (P1) and its
antecedent condition (P2)? We can now see that this question is incom-
plete. Since modals have a rather skeletal meaning, the proper ques-
tion is whether, given a particular reading, the ‘ought’-claim detaches
on that reading. In response, we can answer thus: Yes—and this is the
important point—but only if ‘ought’ is given the same interpretation
in the conclusion as in the premises. Recall that modal sentences ex-
press propositions only relative to certain conversational backgrounds.
So, (1∗) will be valid, but only if the ‘ought’s in (P1) and (C1) are inter-
preted relative to the same modal base and ordering source (or at least
relative to modal bases and ordering sources that do not change be-
yond the limits set by logical consequence).13 Given our interpretation
of (P1), the ‘ought’-claim in the conclusion will detach only if ‘ought’
takes the circumstantial modal base describing the relevant facts and
13Though contexts do change in evolving discourses and deliberation, I take
it that validity, in the sense relevant to the evaluation of logical arguments in
favor of a particular conclusion, requires interpretation with respect to a stable
or constant context—where contexts are the sorts of things that, among other
things, provide modals’ domains of quantification. This point has been empha-
sized in a variety of areas—e.g., in discussions of conditionals (Stalnaker 1984,
125–126; von Fintel 2001), negative polarity items (von Fintel 1999, Kadmon
and Landman 1993), vagueness (Lewis 1979, 353–354), and epistemic contex-
tualism (DeRose 2009, chs. 4–5). More formally, I have in mind the following
notion of validity (where !α"c is the possible worlds proposition expressed by
α in context c):
(i) α1, . . . , αn entail β iff for all contexts c : !α1"c ∩ · · · ∩ !αn"c ⊆ !β"c
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the teleological ordering source describing the contextually specified
goals.
Now turn to the more problematic (2∗).
(2∗) (P3) If you want to torture innocent people like they did in
medieval times, you ought to torture them with thumb-
screws.
(P4) You want to torture innocent people like they did in
medieval times.
(C2) So, you ought to torture innocent people with thumb-
screws.
The ‘want’ in (P3)’s antecedent can trigger a teleological reading of
the ‘ought’ in the consequent, which is part of why we may find (P3)
intuitively correct. However, when ‘ought’ is unembedded— like in
(C2)—we may be inclined to pick an ordering source that is most
appropriate in light of the content of the ‘ought’-claim. So, sentences
like (C2) tend to strike us as false when uttered on their own—and
even perhaps in the context of the argument in (2∗)—because cer-
tain actions, like torture, tend to trigger a moral context, a context in
which moral norms are salient. In typical contexts we are likely to fill
out (C2) as follows: “Ordering alternatives in terms of the content of
morality, torturing innocent people with thumbscrews is best.” This is
clearly false. However, this does not show that ‘ought’ does not detach.
Rather, on the one hand, if the conclusion is interpreted in this way, (2∗)
is invalid, because ‘ought’ takes different implicit ordering sources in
(P3) and (C2)— i.e., teleological and moral, respectively. On the other
hand, if ‘ought’ is given the same moral interpretation throughout, the
argument is valid but unsound, since the conditional is false. In this
way, the general Kratzer semantics allows us to capture the intuition
driving the ambiguity response in §2 in an explanatory, theoretically
satisfying way, and without positing a lexical ambiguity.14
14For discussion of how context helps select for particular readings of
modals, see the linguistics references in n. 4. See Dowell 2012 for a similar,
Similar remarks hold for our quantificational variant of the detach-
ing problem in (5).
(5) (P5) Most people who want to torture innocent people like
they did in medieval times ought to torture them with
thumbscrews.
(P6) A, B, and C each wants to torture innocent people like
they did in medieval times.
(C3) So, A ought to torture innocent people with thumb-
screws, or B ought to torture innocent people with
thumbscrews, or C ought to torture innocent people
with thumbscrews.
In (P5), the phrase ‘people who want to torture innocent people’ re-
stricts the domain of the quantifier ‘most’. Roughly, (P5) is true iff
most values for x that satisfy ‘x wants to torture innocent people’ sat-
isfy ‘ought(x uses thumbscrews)’. (P5) says that most people who want
to torture innocent people are such that in view of their goals, using
thumbscrews is best. If (P6) is true, we will be able to validly derive
the conclusion, but—as in (2∗)—only if the ‘ought’s are given the ap-
propriate teleological interpretations: in view of their respective goals,
either A, B, or C ought to use thumbscrews to do their torturing.
Thus, intuitions that ‘ought’ does not detach may result from giv-
ing ‘ought’ a different reading in the unembedded conclusion than in
independently developed view (cf. Wertheimer 1972, 95–96; Jackson 1985, 191–
192). However, first, as discussed in §2, Dowell’s objections to the wide-scope
view are inconclusive. Second, Dowell doesn’t address the role of hypothetical
imperatives in practical reasoning (see below in this section and §4). Third, pace
Dowell, accepting this sort of response to the detaching problem won’t allow
one to hold on to modus ponens for the indicative conditional, at least if one ac-
cepts a restrictor analysis for conditionals, as Dowell as does; such an analysis
doesn’t validate modus ponens anyway. (However, it is worth mentioning that
this violation of modus ponens is due to general features of the semantics of
modals and conditionals (see Silk 2013). The point in the main text can thus be
understood as saying that if (2∗) is invalid it is not because of any features that
distinguish it from (1∗). The (in)validity of (1∗) and (2∗) stand or fall together. I
return to this issue in §4.)
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the hypothetical imperative—specifically, by interpreting ‘ought’ rel-
ative to different ordering sources. But if we give ‘ought’ a constant
teleological interpretation, even (2∗) is sound; we can conclude that
your torturing innocent people with thumbscrews is best in view of
your goals. Of course, the conclusion will have only modest practical
import. But this is not surprising. We should not expect to derive con-
clusions about what we ought to do considering what is moral from
premises about what we ought to do considering our goals— that is,
unless we add the dubious assumption that we morally ought to do
whatever will realize our goals.
Finally, the considerations in this section suggest an explanation
for an otherwise puzzling type of AMP that has been ignored in the
literature. Consider (10).
(10) (P7) If you want to be a decent person, you ought to help the
poor.
(P8) You want to be a decent person.
(C4) So, you ought to help the poor.
On the one hand, this argument may strike us as unobjectionable. The
conclusion is true and seems to detach. But, on the other hand, there
is something strange about (10). After all, we tend to think that there
are better factors grounding one’s obligations to the poor beyond one’s
goals. We now have the resources to explain these two intuitions. First,
the argument may seem unproblematic because the conclusion is true
on the moral reading we may be inclined to give it: considering what is
moral, you ought to help the poor. However, second, the argument may
seem odd since, as above, we do not think that moral ‘ought’s follow
from facts about our goals, whatever they are, and what will realize
them. Instead, the conclusion that follows is simply that, considering
your goal of being a decent person, you ought to help the poor. So,
as above, though the practical import of the conclusion in (10), on the
relevant teleological reading, is modest, the conclusion does detach.
Thus, the intuitive appeal of (10) over (2∗) is spurious. (10) may
strike us as unobjectionable because, as it turns out, ordering alter-
natives in terms of the content of morality and in terms of your goal
of being a decent person, giving to the poor is best. In contrast, (2∗)
strikes us as problematic because ordering alternatives in terms of the
content of morality, it’s not the case that torturing innocent people
with thumbscrews is best—even if ordering alternatives in terms of
your goals, this action is best.15
I have argued that ‘ought’ detaches in the following sense: Given
the truth of a hypothetical imperative and its antecedent condition, we
can derive a claim about what one ought to do in view of certain rele-
vant goals. Contrary to much of the literature on rational requirements
and instrumental reason (see nn. 3, 17), the ‘ought’s in natural lan-
guage hypothetical imperatives are given a goal-based interpretation,
not a moral or practical interpretation.16 This has obscured theorizing
about the normative import of AMPs. What should we say, then, about
the practical upshot of these arguments? In §2 we noted that hypo-
thetical imperatives do not seem to be practically inert. Even though
in AMPs we can only detach modest teleological ‘ought’-claims, we
can still capture the intuition that hypothetical imperatives can often
15In a recent response to the detaching problem, Stephen Finlay (2010) uses
what he takes to be an alternative to a Kratzerian ordering semantics for
modals and conditionals in an argument that ‘ought’ does not detach (see
also his 2009). I do not speak to Finlay’s account in this paper. Most impor-
tant for our purposes is that Finlay’s semantics for strong necessity modals
(‘must’, ‘have to’) validates detachment in the modest sense described in this
section. Finlay’s comparative probability semantics for weak necessity modals
like ‘ought’ raises issues orthogonal to the central points in this paper (see
n. 11). (Also, despite Finlay’s claims to the contrary, his analyses can be un-
derstood as instances of the general Kratzerian ordering semantics/premise
semantics framework.)
16This is not to say that all conditionals of the same surface form as (P1)
or (P3) have an anankastic meaning. The ‘ought’ in (i) may be given a moral
reading (cf. Hare 1971, 45).
(i) If you want to torture innocent people like they did in medieval times,
you ought to see a psychiatrist.
However, conditionals like (i) are not hypothetical imperatives in the sense
relevant in the sorts of arguments that give rise to the detaching problem.
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be used in deliberation to generate normative, action-guiding conclu-
sions.
Purpose ‘in order to’-sentences—sentences like ‘In order to get to
the Hancock building, you have to take Michigan Avenue’—express
technical requirements. They are claims about the necessary means
to certain ends. But hypothetical imperatives do not merely express
technical requirements. In hypothetical imperatives we deploy those
requirements in the service of meeting certain ends, in effect by plug-
ging them into ends that have those requirements. The apparent nor-
mative force of hypothetical imperatives derives from the fact that we
often take our ends to supply us with at least pro tanto reasons for ac-
tion, reasons to take the means to those ends (or at least the optimal or
necessary means). Many find it plausible that from the fact that, con-
sidering my goals and the relevant circumstances, I ought to φ, I can
often conclude that I have at least a pro tanto reason to φ—this in light
of an implicit premise like the following:
(11) bridge
If, considering certain of one’s goals and the relevant circum-
stances, one ought to φ, then, at least in most circumstances,
one has at least a pro tanto reason to φ.
This principle is weak in two ways. First, as the “at least in most cir-
cumstances” qualification suggests, bridge is weaker than the claim
that for any set of goals, one has a normative reason to do what-
ever will best realize them. This stronger claim is contentious; many
philosophers reject it.17 Though I find the weaker claim in bridge to
be plausible, I will not attempt to defend it here. Second, bridge leaves
open, for any particular AMP, how much normative reason (if any) it
supplies. The normative import of a hypothetical imperative on some
17See Bratman 1987 and Broome 2001a for important critiques. For further
discussion, see Korsgaard 1997, Schroeder 2004, 2005, Kolodny 2005, 2007,
2008a,b, Raz 2005, Piller 2007, Scanlon 2007, Setiya 2007, van Roojen 2008,
Bedke 2009, Dreier 2009, Railton 2010, Way 2010. See also the references in
n. 3.
occasion may depend on the strength of the normative reasons sup-
plied by the goals in question, given the agent’s circumstances. What
is important for present purposes is that AMPs are valid arguments
that yield lemmas that may be used in larger pieces of practical rea-
soning. The extent to which one takes these lemmas to generate further
practical conclusions about one’s normative reasons for action depends
on one’s broader commitments about substantive normative principles
like bridge.
4. Detachment and salient goals
In this section I would like to revisit certain of our simplifying as-
sumptions from §3. There I assumed that the relevant agent’s goals are
jointly consistent with each other and with the goal introduced in the
hypothetical imperative. For purposes of generality I also abstracted
away from technical details regarding how the intended truth condi-
tions of hypothetical imperatives are generated. However, it is worth
noting that certain semantics for hypothetical imperatives do not val-
idate modus ponens, even when the premises and conclusion are all
evaluated with respect to a constant global context (see n. 13).
On the semantics in von Fintel and Iatridou 2005 and Huitink
2005a,b, modals can sometimes be interpreted with respect to certain
designated or contextually salient goals rather than with respect to all
of the agent’s goals. (Differences in their analyses will not be relevant
here. Huitink generalizes this point to other types of ordering sources.)
A teleological ordering source can consist of a set of propositions de-
scribing some contextually salient subset of the agent’s goals. First,
suppose that in the conversational context c, your salient goals (and
the relevant circumstances) are such that in view of them, you ought
to φ, where your φ-ing is incompatible with your taking Michigan Av-
enue. For example, suppose that your goal of going to Wrigley Field
is salient in the context, and that in light of this goal you ought to
take Clark Street. Second, note that one way of making a goal highly
salient is to introduce it in the antecedent of a conditional. Supposing,
as is standard, that the consequent of a conditional is to be interpreted
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with respect to the local context c+ set up by its antecedent— i.e., the
global discourse context incremented with the proposition expressed
by the antecedent18—(P1) can still be true in the global context c. This
is because the introduction of the goal in the antecedent shifts the con-
text relevant for the interpretation of the consequent to c+ where it is
your goal of going to the Hancock Building that is salient. As it turns
out, you do want to go to the Hancock Building; you have incompati-
ble goals. However, your goal of going to the Hancock Building is not
salient in the global context c. Call this case ‘wrigley’.
Given this description of your goals and their relative salience in
the global conversational context c, the following sentences are all true
in c, even where both ‘ought’s are given a teleological interpretation.
(12) a. You ought to take Clark Street. (⇒ It’s not the case that
you ought to take Michigan Avenue.)
b. If you want to go to the Hancock Building, you ought to
take Michigan Avenue.
c. You want to go to the Hancock Building.
As is evident, the consistency of (12) violates modus ponens. (Not to
worry: this is modus ponens for the indicative conditional, not the
truth-functional material conditional.) This violation is unsurprising
on the “salient goal” analysis. First, though it might be true that you
want to go to the Hancock Building, this goal is not salient in the
global context. Since teleological modals can be sensitive to what goals
are salient, the mere fact that you have a certain goal, together with the
truth of an associated hypothetical imperative, will not be sufficient to
entail the consequent of the hypothetical imperative. Second, since the
consequent of a conditional is interpreted with respect to its local con-
text, the ordering source for the teleological modal in (12b) may only
contain the proposition that you go to the Hancock Building. So, the
18See, e.g., Karttunen 1974, Stalnaker 1974, Heim 1990.
sentences in (12)—even when both ‘ought’s are interpreted teleologi-
cally—can all be true with respect to a constant global context.19
With respect to our constant context c, (C1) is not entailed by (P1)
and (P2), at least on a salient-goal-style semantics. However, this poses
no threat to our claim in §3 about why, and in what sense, ‘ought’
detaches. Even if we have a failure of modus ponens in cases like
wrigley, we do not have a failure of detachment in the sense that
ethicists have cared about. First, the reasons why detachment fails in
wrigley have nothing to do with the considerations that concerned
us in §1. There we were worried about detachment because of an il-
licit shift in context; we were interpreting (C2) and (P3) with respect
to different types of ordering sources. In wrigley detachment fails be-
cause of general features of the semantics of modals and conditionals.
So, we can still maintain that ‘ought’ detaches in the sense described
in §3: given the truth of a hypothetical imperative and its antecedent
condition, we can detach a claim about what the agent ought to do in
view of the goal described in the minor premise and the antecedent of
the conditional. More generally, ‘ought’s will detach in AMPs where
the goal introduced in the antecedent of the hypothetical imperative is
consistent with the other goals that are salient in the context (though
see n. 13).
Second, though modus ponens inferences like wrigley are not clas-
sically valid, they are valid in another sense: they are dynamically valid.
Roughly, for a set of premises to dynamically entail a conclusion, it
must be that when the premises are successfully asserted and accepted,
the context set of the evolving context entails the proposition expressed
by the conclusion in that evolved context.20 (The “context set” is the
19Readers familiar with the recent literature on the Miners Puzzle may have
noticed that the reasons for modus ponens violations with hypothetical imper-
atives are structurally analogous to the reasons for modus ponens violations
with information-sensitive deontic ‘ought’. See, e.g., Kolodny and MacFarlane
2010 and Silk 2013 for discussion.
20Compare the notion of a “reasonable inference” in Stalnaker 1975, an im-
portant inspiration for much work in dynamic semantics. See Veltman 1996
on various notions of dynamic entailment. See Willer 2012 and Silk 2013 for
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set of live possibilities in the conversation, the set of worlds consis-
tent with what is mutually presupposed.) In assessments of dynamic
validity, premises not only play their usual classical role of ruling out
possibilities; they also change the context with respect to which sub-
sequent sentences are interpreted. For instance, in the cases at hand, if
evaluating a premise changes which goals are salient, this may affect
the interpretation of subsequent sentences in the argument.
Informally, suppose we begin in a context that leaves open whether
you want to go to the Hancock Building. (We must do so if the condi-
tional is to be felicitous.) I assert (P1), which is successfully added to
the common ground. Next, we consider your goal of going to the Han-
cock Building and I assert (P2), which is also accepted. Since (P2) is
not only true but also accepted, (a) the context set is reduced to worlds
where you want to go to the Hancock Building, and (b) your goal of
going to the Hancock Building becomes highly salient. This affects the
interpretation of ‘ought’ in (C1). Since the ‘ought’ is interpreted with
respect to the now highly salient goal of going to the Hancock Build-
ing, the proposition expressed by (C1) in this new context is entailed
by the resulting context set. So, (P1) and (P2) dynamically entail (C1).
In any context in which the first two are successively asserted and
accepted, the resulting context is such that asserting the third would
not bring about a change in the context (except for adding the fact
that it has been asserted).21 In deliberation and conversation we can
legitimately detach claims about what we ought to do in view of the
discussion of the importance of a dynamic notion of entailment in logics and
semantics for information-sensitive deontic modals.
21See Silk 2013 for a proof in the case of information-sensitive deontic
modals.
relevant goals from associated hypothetical imperatives upon learn-
ing, or merely reminding ourselves of, the truth of their antecedent
conditions.
5. Conclusion
On a broadly Kratzerian analysis of modals, modals like ‘ought’ have
a rather skeletal meaning and receive a particular reading or interpre-
tation only given certain forms of contextual supplementation. I have
argued that ‘ought’-claims can detach in the following sense: they can
be derived from associated conditionals and their antecedent condi-
tions, but only as long as the ‘ought’s are interpreted relative to the
same (teleological) ordering sources. Concerns about whether ‘ought’
detaches occur when the ordering source relevant for the interpretation
of the ‘ought’ in the hypothetical imperative yields a different verdict
for the status of the proposition embedded under the modal than the
most (or a) likely candidate ordering source relevant for the interpreta-
tion of the ‘ought’ in the conclusion were the conclusion considered on
its own. Detached ‘ought’-claims can play an important role in prac-
tical reasoning. They can serve as lemmas which, in conjunction with
certain substantive normative assumptions, may figure in larger prac-
tical arguments to generate conclusions about one’s reasons for action.
The present account also improves upon rival wide-scoping accounts.
Unable to generate the correct meanings of certain quantified ‘ought’-
sentences, wide-scoping accounts cannot adequately solve quantifica-
tional variants of the detaching problem.22
22For helpful discussion, thanks to Nate Charlow, Bernhard Nickel, Peter
Railton, Eric Swanson, two anonymous referees from Philosophers’ Imprint,
and audiences at the 2010 Australasian Association of Philosophy Confer-
ence, the 2011 Harvard-MIT Graduate Philosophy Conference, the 2011 Indi-
ana Philosophical Association Spring Meeting, the 2011 Rocky Mountain Ethics
Congress, and the 2011 Eastern APA.
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